















Over the last two years a research field has developed under the banner of "neuroeconomics" in 
which recent neuroscientific methods are deploid to analyze economically relevant processes. 
This paper aims to provide an overview of the methodology and current state of neuroeconomic 
research by giving a brief definition of the concept of neuroeconomics, outlining relevant 
methodologies, and describing studies undertaken in the current research areas to date. Finally, 
some future prospects are considered.  
 1  Concept and background 
For quite some time now, under the banner of "neuroeconomics", the scientific community has 
offered first approaches to apply modern neuroscientific methods to questions that are relevant to 
economic and business research (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec (2003)). This debate primarily 
draws upon theories and problems related to behavioral economics (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen (2003), Smith (2002)) as well as marketing research (McClure et al. (2004b), 
Kenning, Plaßmann, Deppe, Kugel, & Schindt (2002)). Research has been motivated by the lack 
of empirically-based statements on intrapersonal decision-making processes. A good example is 
the still unresolved series of questions as to how emotions, feelings and moods influence decision 
making. Put more precisely: when and how, but most of all, why such influences prevail is a 
matter of particular interest (Zizzo (2003), Weinberg & Salzmann (2004)). 
Such lack of clarity can be explained by the fact that intrapersonal decision-making processes 
cannot be observed. Although it is certainly possible to vary stimuli and observe reactions in 
experimental research the underlying thought processes have to be reconstructed theoretically. As 
neuroscientific methods and findings improve, researchers hope to support these theoretical 
constructs empirically in the near future, thereby contributing to a further development in 
economic theory. Therefore one can define neuroeconomics as the attempt to investigate 
economic-related behavior by using neuroscientific methods. 
2  Overview of neuroscientific techniques 
In order to extend the concept, neuroscientific methods which can be used in this research area 
need to be specified. Because the syllable "neuro" indicates that these methods deal with an 
analysis of the nervous system, all methods which relate to activities of the nervous system, are 
initially taken into consideration. Accordingly, also procedures which provide "peripheral indicators" (Kroeber-Riel & Weinberg (2003), S. 67) and electrodermal reactions (Groeppel-
Klein & Germelmann (2003), S. 56ff.) would be seen as part of neuroeconomic research. 
However, the latter methods are not central to neuroeconomic research. Rather, in the relevant 
literature the five techniques outlined in Table 1 are used, which are relating to activities in the 
brain as part of the central nervous system. These can be grouped into two categories according 
to the underlying mechanisms: procedures for measuring electrical activity of the brain and those 
for measuring neural metabolism processes (for an introduction seePosner & Raichle (1997)).  
 
Changes in electric currents   Changes in metabolism  
Elektroencephalography (EEG)  Positron-Emissions-Tomography (PET) 
Functional transcranial Doppler-Sonography (FTCD)  Magnetencephalography (MEG) 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
Table 1: Overview of neuroscientific techniques and their bases 
 
2.1  Methods of measuring electrical activity 
Electroencephalography is the oldest of the methods listed. With the aid of the EEG, the 
researcher acquires information about electronic activity of the brain. Through electrodes placed 
on the skin of respondents, variations in tension can be measured on the surface of the brain. The 
temporal resolution capabilities of EEG are measured in milliseconds. This facilitates a precise 
determination of the sequence of brain activities. However, this temporal precision is obtained at 
the cost of spatial depiction as only activity at the surface of the brain can be measured.  
This problem is partly resolved by the use of Magnetencephalography (MEG). This procedure 
captures magnetic currents running along individual nerve fibers. In comparison to the EEG, this 
has the advantage of being able to depict also deeper cortical brain structures (see Braeutigam, Stins, Rose, Swithenby, & Ambler (2001), Braeutigam, Rose, Swithenby, & Ambler (2004)) 
Furthermore, this technology provides an excellent overview of the temporal structure of 
decision-making processes as clarified by the following quotation from a brand study by 
Bräutigam et al. (2001, p. 241): 
“Choosing among different brands of closely related products activated a robust sequence of 
signals within the first seconds after the presentation of the choice images. This sequence 
engaged first the visual cortex (80-100 ms), then as the images were analyzed, predominantly the 
left temporal regions (310-340 ms). At longer latency, characteristic neural activation was found 
in motor speech areas (500-520 ms) for images requiring low salience choices with respect to 
previous (brand) memory, and in right parietal cortex for high salience choices (850-920 ms).”  
2.2  Methods of measuring metabolic processes  
Positron emissions tomography (PET) is a nuclear medicine technology through which 
metabolic processes in the body can be investigated (Aine (1995)). A weakly radioactive 
substance is added to the bloodstream of a test person by way of injection or inhalation. With the 
aid of detectors, regions of the brain in which there is a higher level of activity in the form of 
increased metabolic activity, can be captured. This data is processed into maps in which 
activation differences can be depicted. Despite excellent spatial resolution the application to 
healthy test persons is controversial, because of the use of radioactive contrast substances,  
With the procedure of functional transcranial Doppler sonography  (FTCD), by means of 
ultrasound, averaged and event-related blood flow velocities are measured simultaneously within 
in two cerebral arteries (for an overview see Deppe, Ringelstein, & Knecht (2004)). If, in one 
artery, the activity rises relative to the other in executing a particular function, conclusions can be 
drawn as to differences in blood flow velocity. The advantage of this procedure is that the results 
are easily reproducible, are not limited to large pieces of equipment and are relatively cost-effective and flexible. For example, they can be used at the point of sale. However, a 
disadvantage of the procedure is that the emphasis can only be on certain areas of the brain (so-
called "regions of interest"). In the preliminary stages, therefore, the researcher must have an idea 
as to which areas are to be observed. 
Functional magnetic resonance tomography (fMRI) is currently the most popular technology. 
This procedure uses magnetic fields and radio waves in order to depict different kinds of body 
tissue. The strength of transmitted MR signals varies according to the density of the different 
kinds of body tissue and the strength of the magnetic field. The MR signals are captured by 
detectors and, by means of a computer, converted through mathematical and statistical 
procedures into colored maps. Activations in specific regions can be isolated with the help of 
mathematical transformations and statistical inference. 
3  A short introduction to the most important regions of the brain 
The human brain is the most complex structure that we know. On average, the female brain 
weighs 1245 grams and the male brain, 1375 grams. From the neuropsychological perspective, it 
forms the centre of all psychological processes. Even though this statement is currently generally 
accepted, manifestation of psychic phenomena within the brain structure has been controversial 
for some time. The phrenologists of the 18th century were still convinced that a particular area of 
the brain was responsible for specific functions. At present, referring to higher cognitive brain 
functions, this "strict localization theory" is obsolete. Scientists now recognize that, for many 
neural processes, several centers work together (Miyashita (2004), p. 435). Only through this "co-
operative" work does perception of reality as we regard it take place. If one initially considers the 
brain in a superficial manner, one can immediately recognize that the cerebral cortex consists of 
two halves, the so-called "hemispheres". Considered anatomically, the left half comprises primarily a number of short neural connections. On the other hand, the right half comprises 
mainly long connections linked to brain areas which are far apart from one another. Furthermore, 
the left half of the brain is generally somewhat larger than the right half. The assumption that 
both halves of the brain perform different functions was (apparently) confirmed by the 
experiments of ROGER  SPERRY. In order to treat certain forms of epilepsy, he severed the 
connection between the two halves, the corpus callosum, in order to restrict the epileptic attacks 
to one half only. In the case of these so-called "split-brain" patients, Sperry discovered a series of 
distinctive processes which he attributed to the different functions of the two halves of the brain. 
Accordingly, these patients could, for example, read something that was located on the left side 
of their face with the aid of the right half of the brain and write this with the left hand, which was 
similarly controlled by this side, but not say what they had read and written, provided the words 
not been "seen" by the left half of the brain. If one then assumes that the left half is responsible 
primarily for the spoken and written language as well as mathematical capabilities, the right half 
handles spatial perceptions and recognition of patterns. This assumption forms the basis for the 
so-called hemisphere theory which is often presented in marketing theory in a very much 
abridged form.  
Apart from this rough and superficial differentiation, two distinct procedures are used to describe 
spatial neural activity. Firstly, there is the approach developed by Brodman. He established that 
cell structures in the brain differ. Based on this observation, he suggested a means of dividing the 
brain into 52 areas (Albright, Jessell, Kandel, & Posner (2000)). As before, a customary approach 
towards identifying and naming the most important areas of the brain is the division into the so-
called Brodman areas (BA). With respect to economic research, in particular the middle front 
cortex (BA 8 and BA 6) seems to be of particular significance. Accordingly, a meta-analysis of 
the medial frontal cortex by Ridderinkhoff et al. (2004) reveals that the primary activation differences in decision-making activities related to uncertainty, are to be found in an area with an 
edge length of 30 mm x 30 mm (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis (2004)).The 
following figure provides an overview of the brain divided into the various Brodman areas. 
 
Figure 1: The cytoarchitechtonic brain map of Brodman (1906).  
 
However, the division suggested by Brodman has, in the meantime, proven too approximate and 
imprecise. Accordingly, different brain atlases have been developed in order to map different 
brain areas with the help of a three dimensional coordinate system. The first and most prominent 
one was published by Talairach and Tournoux in 1980 (Talairach & Tournoux (1988)) for the 
purpose of stereotaxis. Today, the different data analyzing software packages use enhanced 
reference brains which are based on Talairach and Tournoux’s work such as the reference brain 
from the Monteral Neurological Institute (MNI). Thus, each activity can be allocated on the x,y-level and in z-direction (for orientation see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Orientation of axes with reference to Talairach and Tournoux (1988).  
 
A typical neuroeconomic study regularly comprises information about the currently active 
Brodman area and the exact allocation of Talaraich or MNI coordinates.  
 
4  Overview of the first applications in economic research  
The number of neuroeconomic studies is still sufficiently low that one can maintain a reasonable 
perspective and understanding of its full range. Worldwide, barely more than fifty research 
groups deal explicitly with the subject of "Neuroeconomics".
1 Similarly, several commercial 
suppliers have already been able to establish themselves in the market.
2 However, their work is 
both ethically and methodologically controversial (Blakeslee (2004)). Table 2 provides an 
overview of the scientific application of the various techniques as well as the scientific studies, 
the basic issues with which they deal, and the results obtained.  
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social incentives  
fMRI  Products which symbolize wealth 
and status lead to increased 
activity in areas of the brain that 








respect to markets 
Neural correlates of 
brands in decision-
making processes 
fMRI  Subjectively strong brands relieve 
pressure on areas responsible for 
rational processes and lead to 
increase activity in those areas 












gains and losses 
Neural carriers of 
attitudes about 
monetary payments 
(gains or losses) 
and assumptions 
about possible 
outcomes (risk or 
ambiguity) 
PET Independence  between  attitudes 
about payments and assumptions 
about the probability of outcomes 













fMRI  Interrelationships between fair 
and unfair behavior and areas of 
the brain which are responsible 
for Processing positive and 
negative emotional states as well 
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MEG Negative  interrelationship 
between brand familiarity and 
time required for decision-
making, negative interrelationship 
between simple purchasing 











neural correlates of 
expectations benefit 
theory 
fMRI  Significant role of emotions in 
anticipating stimuli with respect 









neural bases of 
"altruistic 
punishment" 
PET  Sanctions against defectors 
activate reward centers in the 





Neural impact of 
visual stimuli 
(brand) 
Neural bases for 
evaluating a soft 
drink 
fMRI  Depending on whether and, if yes, 
what brand information given to 
subjects will activate the 
enjoyment of a soft drink with 
respect to various different 














fMRI Short-term  premiums  activate 
limbic regions, long-term 
premiums are processed in the 
prefrontal cortex 
Table 2: overview of first neuroeconomics research projects (chronological order) 
 
An initial and common result of these studies is that, depending on the stimulus, context and 
emotional state of the decision-making object, highly varied decision-making processes can be 
observed (McClure et al. (2004a)). In the following section, the academic rationale for analyzing 
decision-making processes in a differentiated manner will be considered. Two significant 
attributes of these decision-making processes are already evident: non-linearity (Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio (1997)) and a networked construction of the decision process (Paulus & Frank (2003)) - the prefrontal cortex thus seems to assume the role of an important 
hub. The available time also exerts a substantial influence on the prevailing network 
configuration. Decisions which require a rapid reaction are processed differently to those which 
can be made over longer periods of time. This also explains why the so-called Stroop Task (for 
an application see Kerns Kerns et al. (2004)) implies that with a shortening of the decision-
making interval, there is a correspondingly drastic increase in the rate of errors.
3 Against this 
background, it is surprising that only a few neuroeconomists work with the MEG, because it 
provides a sound temporal resolution. Finally, the results obtained in this manner can be used to 
develop a typology of various different decision-making subjects (for example effective or 
rational decision makers).  
5  Current topics in neuroeconomic research 
5.1  Preferences and benefits 
Preferences play a substantial role in economic theory (Slovic (1995), pp 364).
4 An important 
reason for this is its influence on decision-making behavior. In traditional studies, preferences are 
often reconstructed. As a supplement to this, neuroeconomic research can capture preferences in 
the process that can be observed through neural activity which correlates with the behavior in 
question. By so doing, it is possible to associate different preferences with different activity 
patterns and thus to draw conclusions, for example, as to the elasticity of demand (Camerer et al. 
(2003)). 
An advantage of neuroeconomics is that preferences can be spatially and temporally 
differentiated according to their development. The statement is based on a supposition that 
differing preferences - Kahneman differentiated between four types (Kahneman (1994b)) - are 
"produced" in different places in the brain. If this supposition is confirmed, it would, for example, be possible to determine whether a cigarette smoker would select a particular brand because, for 
him, it represents a particular demonstrative function or because he is addicted to the smoke from 
that brand (see Camerer et al. (2003), pp. 12). 
The neural bases of the benefit construct constitute a further facet of neuroeconomic research (for 
a delineation of the concept of benefit and preference see Drakopoulos (1990)). In general, it is 
extremely difficult to measure the benefits from a good objectively and validly, because it always 
seems subjective and situation-dependent (see, for example, the criterion of Pareto Optimality 
which is based on this assumption). However, neuroeconomic methodologies can overcome these 
difficulties, because, in general, for many decisions, activation can be observed in the so-called 
"reward areas" of the brain (Erk et al. (2002)). If it were possible to develop a category for 
measuring this activation, this could then be used as an instrument for measuring subjective 
benefit. The "benefits balance" of a measure which could affect two or more people, would then 
be objectively measurable. 
The influence that neuroeconomics has already exerted on researching the benefit construct, 
becomes evident when considering the utility of money. In classical economic theory, the utility 
of money is always derived. One can neither eat nor drink it and money cannot satisfy needs. 
Money is only useful, because a certain amount facilitates the acquisition of goods. However, this 
can only explain in part, why certain people still attempt to maximize their income even when 
this may lead them to ruin (addiction to gambling, for example). Neuroeconomic studies prove 
that money income activates so-called "reward areas" in the brain. Accordingly, the utility of 
money is not, as previously assumed, only derived, but also intrinsic.  
The research of hedonistic behavior aims in a similar direction. People who reveal such behavior 
often derive utility not from the use of a particular good, but from the purchasing experience 
itself. It is well known that compulsive buyers often barely use the goods they purchase, but proceed directly to buy new ones. It can be assumed that such behavior is similarly accompanied 
by an activation of reward areas in the brain. The following section will demonstrate that 
hedonistic behavior can invalidate a significant premise of decision theory, namely the 
transitivity axiom. This axiom requires that when the following applies:  
(x') > (x), it is not possible for  
(x)  > (x') to occur.  
(x) and (x') represent two bundles of goods. The validity of this mathematically extremely 
important premise has been contentiously debated in the literature ({Humphrey, 2001 #8596). 
There are many studies in which it has been broken. The most well-known phenomena are the 
money pump problem and the problem of reverse preferences. From the neuroeconomic 
perspective, a possible explanation is that the exchange of a good in itself can create utility which 
exceeds the negative utility of sacrificing the necessary monetary outlay
5  
Finally, the first studies on the subject of "temporal preferences“ prove that guaranteed short-term 
premium payments are subject to a different decision-making process than long-term payments 
({McClure, 2004 #8604}). This has already led to a modification of the previous model.  
5.2  Fairness, trust, altruism  
In classical theoretical approaches, the ideal image of the "Bayesian maximizer" is suggested. 
This image is characterized by behavior which maximizes one's own subjective (expected) utility. 
If these premises are confronted with the data acquired from experiments, various theoretical 
problems arise (see e. g. Kahneman (1994a), Frey (1990)). Accordingly, in the context of the 
Ultimatum Game, it becomes evident that people often behave fairly, rather than purely to 
maximize their own benefit. With the aid of the fMRI, Sanfey et al. were able to prove that 
fairness is typically associated with activations in particular regions of the brain, more precisely, 
the anterior insula and the dorsolateral, prefrontal cortex (Sanfey et al. (2003)). These areas probably play an important role in integrating emotions into neural decision-making processes. 
Their role presumably derives from evolutionary processes. In an analogous manner, the 
economists Bolton and Ockenfels believe that fair behavior is ultimately associated with 
evolution (Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), p. 189). More recent evolution-theory studies support this 
supposition and demonstrate that both fairness and defection inevitably occur in groups (Doebeli, 
Hauert, & Killingback (2004)).  
The Certainty Effect constitutes an additional, significant object of investigation (see e. g. 
Conlisk (1989), p. 392). From the work of Tversky and Kahnemann, we know that a more certain 
alternative will be preferred even when its expected value lies substantially below that of another, 
more risky alternative. From a neuroeconomic perspective, this supposition seems credible, that 
more certain decisions will lead to an immediate activation of reward centers in the brain. This 
then implies that the uncertain alternative will not be considered. Thus far, there are no empirical 
results to support this proposition. The following table provides an overview of the generally 
known cognitive anomalies in decision theory which can be regarded as potential neuroeconomic 
objects of investigation (Eisenführ & Weber (2003), pp. 366). 
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Imperfect memories are rebuilt using contemporary cues and 
historical exemplars 
Initial and recent experiences are remembered selectively  
Coincidences are remembered, non-coincidences are not 
Compression of history 
 
Judgments are influenced by quantitative cue contained in the 
decision task 
Responses rely too heavily on readily retrieved information, and too 
little on background information 
History and framing of the decision task influence perception and 
motivation 
The format of the decision task or order of task, influences the 
weight given to different aspects 
 
Inconsistent probability calculus, asymmetry in gains and losses 
Idiosyncratic causes attached to fluctuations, regression to the mean 
underestimated 




Cognitive Task misconstructed, preferences constructed 
endogenously 
Misrepresentation for real or perceived strategic advantages or to 
reinforce and project self-image. 
Choices are evaluated in terms of changes from a status quo point. 
Choice guided by principles, analogies and exemplars rather than 
utilitarian calculus; rules induce pro forma, focal responses.  
Inconsistency in selecting and weighting information judged 







Current Status and history are favored relative to alternatives not 
experienced 
Causal explanations for coincidences are accepted too readily  
Subjects mistrust offers and question motives of others in unfamiliar 
situations 
Time discounting is temporally inconsistent, instant gratification 
Table 2: Cognitive Anomalies (see McFadden (2004)) 
 
Similar roots such as fairness presumably lie at the basis of the construct of trust.
6 This would seem to be the case, because the emergence of cooperative relationships is often associated with 
initial and risky activities of one form or another. Trust is generally defined formally as a 
rational calculation. Accordingly, Coleman presents a model of trust-related decisions that 
comprises three variables: 1) p, the likelihood of making a profit (a gain). This equals the 
probability that the recipient of trust actually behaves in a trustworthy manner; 2) L (for Losses), 
the potential loss that occurs if trust is breached and 3) G (gain), the potential gain if the recipient 
of trust in fact proves to be trustworthy. The normative hypothesis of this model is that an actor 
will always be accorded trust when the following assumption applies:  
p*G > (1-p)*L 
This model seems convincing, but leaves a number of open questions: how would the giver of 
trust determine the exact value of p in a new situation, for example at the beginning of a new 
business relationship? Where would an individual who is capable of learning, acquire the courage 
to initiate regular cooperative ventures by means of a risky initial transaction or activity, if all 
actors behave opportunistically by definition?
7 And why would there be co-operation between 
individuals in biological systems where the individuals are not fully aware of or able to undertake 
probability calculations (Axelrod (2000), pp. 80). It seems far more realistic that confidence is 
given on the basis of simple and often emotionally characterized heuristics and then reciprocated 
within certain limits. 
The existence of altruistic behavior is also theoretically questionable. For example this manifests 
itself in that Person A accepts monetary disadvantages in order to constrain asocial behavior from 
another Person B even though Person A is not directly affected by the negative behavior. What 
point would such behavior have for A? By using PET, a research group led by Ernst Fehr was 
able to prove that altruistic behavior leads to an activation of reward regions in the brain and can 
thus create certain benefits and utility (de Quervain et al. (2004)). Obviously, the above-mentioned Person A behaved altruistically, because for him personally, the cost of such behavior 
is rewarded (by his brain!). 
5.3  Memory, learning and knowledge 
The economic relevance of the subject of memory
8 can be depicted very clearly in the context of 
business communications policy. Brand and company recall and recognition are essential 
psychographic goals of communication strategies. In order to achieve this objective, knowledge 
about the fundamental manner in which people absorb, process, and store information is 
necessary. This issue simultaneously forms an essential research area in the cognitive 
neurosciences. 
Against this background, if one considers that in Germany, approximately €20 billion each year 
are spent on advertising investment (Homburg & Krohmer (2003), p. 621) of which, according to 
general opinion, a large proportion has no effect at all, it is evident that substantial inefficiency 
can be assumed to prevail. A successful and practical application of neuroeconomics in this area 
is likely, therefore, to have substantial economic implications. At present, two general trends can 
be determined. Firstly, memory is organized in phases or stages. Secondly, memory content is 
frequently located at different areas within the brain (e. g. Jokeit, Heger, Ebner, & Markowitsch 
(1998) and for an overview see Rösler, Lüer, & Kluwe (2002)). 
The issue of exactly which neural processes influence learning, for example, by customers, 
employees and investors, is closely associated with the subject of neuroeconomics. It is well 
known that explicit knowledge is learnt more quickly than implicit. Furthermore, from the work 
of Eric C. Kandel, we know that for learning purposes, a fundamental conditioning often occurs 
if the particular stimulus (a noise, for example) is preceded with a specific time lag (see Kandel 
& Hawkins (1992)). Thirdly, it has been proven that long-term memory is based on a synthesis of more recent proteins and the formation and extension of new synaptic connections and can 
therefore be observed. By so doing, new approaches to economic research are recognizable in 
this important area. 
If one regards knowledge as "individual problem-solving capabilities", it is evident that memory 
and learning are the fundamental bases of knowledge. Consequently, if one wishes to be 
successful over time in the area of knowledge management, it seems essential to develop a 
neurologically-based theory of the development of knowledge, the basis of which has already 
been discussed and in which the concepts of learning and memory play a central role. 
5.4  Dual-Process -Theory debate 
There is a historically grown and to date non-consensual debate about the mechanisms human 
emotion, cognition, memory, information processing, and behavior are based on (see e. g. Zajonc 
(1980), Lazarus (1982), and for a review on dual process models see Smith & DeCoster (2000)). 
By localizing brain activity during specific cognitive tasks and relating these functions 
neuroanatomically, methods of functional brain imaging are able to visualize different dissociated 
neural networks which are assumed to be responsible for memory, behavior, cognition and 
integrating emotion into decision making (Bechara et al. (1997)). Thus, neuroeconomic studies 
seem to be a promising approach to gain new insights for dual-process theories. 
6  Discussion and future prospects  
The potential of building on an inductive process to develop new theories of economically 
relevant patterns of behavior is generally considered a fundamental advantage of combining 
economics with neurology (Glimcher & Rustichini (2004)). 
At present, there is a particular emphasis on investigating decision-making processes which have 
already been conducted isolated for decades in both disciplines. The interdisciplinary exchange is likely to provide new impulses. Nonetheless, the potential offered by neuroeconomic research is 
limited.  
For one thing, neuroeconomic projects are very personnel cost and time intensive. Few economic 
research institutes are likely in future to have access to the necessary and very substantial 
resources required to purchase an fMRI scanner, for example. The development of synergistic 
research projects may provide a solution to the problem. In this context, both clinical and 
economic issues can be investigated. An example of a possible application would be the 
investigation of different forms of addictive behavior. 
On the other hand, the application of neurological methods is associated with diverse legal and 
moral considerations, such as a lack of problematic ethical issues and the agreement of 
respondents. There is no end to these ethical and legal discussions in sight, and indeed they have 
not really even begun.  
Nonetheless, the neuroeconomic approach seems fundamentally suited to a further development 
of economic theory. In particular, a contribution to a better explanation of economically relevant 
behavior can be expected. This could then be used to increase the predictive power of economic 
models and to base them on more realistic assumptions. The initial characteristics of these new 
models are: 
1.  Non-linearity: decision-making processes do not proceed according to the pattern "the 
more, the better", but rather according to the pattern "yes/no". They have a discreet character at 
the individual level.  
2.  Problem-solving orientation: over the last few years, the notion of the Bayesian 
maximizer has become progressively discredited. It has been replaced by the notion that people 
do not attempt to maximize a particular goal category, but to solve problems (see Slovic, 1995, p. 
369). The analysis of various methods of resolving real economic problems should, therefore, become a more important element of economic research. 
3.  Network structure: There is no such thing like one single decision-making region in the 
human brain which is responsible for decision-making processes. Rather, the brain can be 
considered allegorically as an orchestra comprising several instruments which serve different 
functions in producing a variety of musical pieces.  
4.  Asymmetry between positive and negative stimuli. Positive stimuli are often processed 
in so-called "reward regions", while negative stimuli such as fear and anxiety are processed in the 
limbic system, for example in the amygdala (LeDoux (2000), Seidenbecher, Laxmi, Stork, & 
Pape (2003)).The extent to which both regions interrelate with respect, for example, to 
simultaneous gains and losses and whether there are compensatory relationships, remains unclear.  
5.  Irrelevance of probabilities: diverse paradoxes in game and decision-theory experiments 
can be attributed to the fact that the human brain has not mastered the relatively new concept of 
probability accounting.
9 Consequently, there is the danger of capturing epiphenomena. Rather, 
decision-making strategies tend to have a heuristic character which can be influenced emotionally 
(Slovic (2002)).This may apply particularly to those decisions which are primarily intuitive or 
impulsive.  
6.  Taking time into account: the temporal execution of a decision-making process seems to 
exert a substantial influence on the quality of the decision. In experimental terms, this is evident 
from the several investigations (e. g. McClure et al. (2004a)). 
7.  The cognition/emotion debate: Despite the seemingly relevance of emotion in human 
existence and human behavior, scientist concerned with human nature have not yet been able to 
reach a consensus about the role of emotion in a theory of mind and behavior. 
8.  The role of the mind/body debate: in the business administration and economic 
literature there is often a clear distinction between the neurobiological and psychic processes. If one considers the more recent developments in neurology, this distinction is becoming 
increasingly obsolete (Damasio (1994)). Damasio suggests that neurobiological processes seem 
to be the basis of psychic processes. 
Despite these initial results, neuroeconomics has so far not been able to make substantial progress 
in terms of concepts. The researchers limit themselves primarily to familiar phenomena which 
they investigate with the aid of neuroscientific methods and describe in the language of this 
discipline. Certainly, diverse studies present neuroeconomic correlates, but they do not attempt to 
provide a theoretical foundation. New phenomena which would imply the development of an 
innovative and theory-specific set of concepts are barely discernible to date, yet. A reason for this 
may be that, at present, most neuroeconomists need to work through the familiar anomalies 
discussed earlier in this text, before they turn their attention to developing new questions and 
concepts. Although this process is legitimate, it may entail foregoing the opportunity to provide a 
radical new start to descriptive decision-making theory. References 
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1 An overview can be found at http://www.richard.peterson.net/Neuroeconomics.htm. 
2 The following firms are examples: Market Psychology Consulting. (Finance) San Francisco, CA, USA; Neurosense                                                                                                                                                               
Limited. Oxford, UK; Brighthouse Neurostrategies Group. Atlanta, GA, USA; SalesBrain, LLC. San Francisco, CA, 
USA and Paris, France; Shop Consult. Amstetten, Austria.END   
3 The "Mouse Lab" experiments of Schkade and Johnson (1989) provide the economic equivalent. 
4 If one currently looks up the concept of "preferences" in the EBSCO data bank, there are 15,000 contributions in 
academic publications. 
5 Accordingly, the contravention of this premise does not reduce the  grave associated  mathematical consequences 
6 Vgl. http://fac.cgu.edu/~zakp/CNS/projects.htm 
7 The familiar "tit-for-tat" strategy is characterised precisely by the fact that the first move is one of trust. See 
Axelrod, 2000, S. 12. 
8 Memory should be regarded here as closely associated with the work of Markowitsch (2002:100), and thus, in 
general, as the storage of new information which can be recalled as memory. 
9 “When it comes to quantifying probability evaluations precisely, people are not used to doing this and in fact rail 
against it", Eisenführ/Weber, 2003, p. 151. 
 
 
 